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11 JANUARY 2010
CHR Resolution on the December 5, 2008 Paranaque Alleged Shoot-out:
In line with its promise to sustain its fervour in fulfilling its commitment to the people and to protecting and promoting human rights as it begins a new year, the Commission on Human Rights released another Resolution, this time on the botched December 5, 2008 police operation that had come to be known as the Paranaque Shootout. After releasing a Resolution earlier in the week on the Muhamadiya Hamja Case, where the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) and the Naval Intelligence and Security Force (NISF) had been found liable for torture, outright illegal detention and a host of anomalies in the arrest of Hamja, the CHR now releases what perhaps may be its most damning indictment of the State security forces, specifically, the PNP-HPG operatives.
After an investigation and public inquiry that began as early as the day after the incident in a residential subdivision in Paranaque City, the CHR had come to the conclusion that the police operation was not only an unfortunate display of police incompetence that left 6 innocent civilians (including a 7-yr. old girl) dead, but also a show of blatant disregard for standard operating procedures, brazen police brutality and reckless disregard for human life.
The CHR Resolution, bearing the date 6 January 2010, had found that the police contingent sent to thwart a planned robbery to be committed by elements of the Waray-waray and the Kuratong Baleleng Gangs had failed to cordon off the area and ensure that all civilians could not enter the scene of the operation, resulting in the unfortunate deaths of civilians during the height of the fire fight and afterwards during pursuit of escaping gang members. Particularly, the units assigned as blocking forces were found liable for being unable to secure the perimeter of the operation. The killing of three bystanders is a “direct result of the failure of the combined police forces to set up a proper perimeter for blocking the armed robbers from escaping as well as for preventing innocent civilians from straying into the area covered by the operation. Sampaguita Ave. may not be a busy thoroughfare, but it is undoubtedly an ingress and egress avenue frequented by pedestrians, especially those living inside UPS IV, such as Bernard Tungcab, (who was apparently run over by the escaping gang members) and two others, namely Arnel Macalawan and Jessiery B. Basmayor.”
Another casualty during the escape of gang members was Ronaldo Eusebio, whose motorcycle had been commandeered by one gang member. While driving the motorcycle, obviously under duress with an armed suspect sitting right behind him, Eusebio was in the line of fire when elements of the Highway Patrol Group Team IV peppered them with gunfire. Eusebio, who could not have been carrying a firearm during the chase as he had two hands on the handle bars, was hit by 9 bullets, one of which hit him in the armpit, indicating that by the time that one shot was fired, he apparently had his arms up, presumably in surrender.
In what become the most lamentable of casualties, the deaths of Alfonso De Vera and his seven-year old daughter Lia Allana, who had been on board an Isuzu Crosswind not identified to be a vehicle of the criminal elements, had been peppered with a spray of automatic fire with over 80 slugs recovered in their car. From the findings of forensics experts, Lia Allana was instantly killed by a shot to her temple. From credible, non-police testimonies, Alfonso De Vera, already wounded in the volley of gunfire from elements of the Highway Patrol Group Team II, was able to carry the lifeless body of his daughter from the car to the spot where he was finally killed by two shots at close range, where it appears he was on his knees, his daughter in his arms. One shot was to his face, apparently look up at his killer and one shot to his back, both of which the trajectories were obviously downward indicating that he was executed while he was kneeling.
The CHR Resolution spells out the disastrous circumstances of the killing of the De Veras, who were civilians, unarmed and merely trying to escape from the scene of the main fire fight between criminal elements and police some 150 meters away. HPG Team II, in a litany of operational violations, open fired on a moving vehicle, which is clearly prohibited, together with violations on the use of deadly and reasonable force. After seeing Alfonso alight from his car, members of the team shot him at close range even if he was unarmed. It was only then that they realized they had shot a young girl and that Alfonso was also a civilian.
The CHR Resolution castigated with profound condemnation the members of the police operation and their superiors for concocting incredible and unbelievable narrations of the events surrounding the deaths of the De Veras. The police had claimed that it was the gang members who had unleashed the volley of gunfire at the De Veras, although witnesses testified that only police officers were at the corner where the barrage of bullets had been directed at the De Vera's Crosswind and the two had been killed. Even more perturbing is the fact that none of the long firearms of Team II were submitted to ballistics testing, and internal police reports show that all members of Team II were armed with only pistols, and none were fired, contradicting every eyewitness account of the scene where the De Veras were killed.
The exhaustive fact-intensive 68-page CHR Resolution declared, inter alia:
“The joint PNP HPG-SAF-DIOU/SPD Paranaque UPS IV Operation seems to be, at first glance, first and foremost an inexcusable example of gross negligence in police operations characterized by an utter disregard for the human rights, welfare and safety of innocent civilians as well as the rights of suspects. On deeper inspection, it comes to light that the operation on the December 5, 2008 was worse; it constituted a failure to implement basic standards of law enforcement and human rights of which they should have been aware as part of their training in the PNP, and which is tantamount to a willful disregard of these standards.
xxx
“Despite the fact that the PNP exercised absolute control over the whole stretch of Sampaguita Ave. from the time of their deployment up to the post-operation SOCO investigation, there was total failure to secure the area for the safety of civilians, including the prevention of vehicles used by non-suspects from entering the area.
“Rather than secure the area and ensure the safety of civilians, the PNP, in particular the HPG, treated the area as their private domain on that particular night, ignoring basic rights of civilians, such as the right against arbitrary and illegal arrests and, more importantly, the right against the arbitrary deprivation of life.
“These rights are the most basic of all human rights. They are enshrined and held sacred and inviolable in the UDHR and the ICCPR. They constitute the most basic of all rights of Philippine citizens as provided for in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
“These rights were ignored and deemed non-existent on the night of December 5, 2008 in UPS IV Paranaque, not because the civilians in the area were mistaken for criminals by the police, it was because THEY WERE PRESUMED TO BE CRIMINALS, and this seems to have been taken by the police operatives as justification for the use of force of such magnitude. The PNP turned the urban subdivision avenue into a war zone, and treated everyone within it as an enemy combatant. This explains the complete breakdown in the protection of the human rights of the civilian residents.
“This explains the killing of the De Veras. They were presumed, and not mistaken, to have been robbers, for the mere reason that they happened to be within the area of operations.
“This explains the summary execution of Alfonso De Vera. He was executed at pointblank range despite the fact that he bore no arms because it was presumed, not mistaken, that he was one of the armed robbers. The PNP operatives consciously chose not to follow PNP guidelines or human rights standards and instead took away his life.
“This explains the killing of Ronaldo Eusebio, who was shot 9 times despite the fact that he was already off his motorcycle and carried no firearm, possibly with his hands raised in the air. He was shot because he was presumed, not mistaken, to be an armed robber, an example of the same failure to respect the human rights of a suspect (as Eusebio was initially deemed so) and to follow clear standard procedures.
“Neither De Vera nor Eusebio were killed in a cross-fire or in the heat of a gun-battle – they were both overcome by the superior forces of the PNP, unarmed in the face of the weapons of the HPG men, and it was clearly possible to take them into custody for proper and legal procedures of detention and determination of their possible identification as suspected armed robbers, if such was indeed the operatives’ belief.
“This presumption, and failure to adhere to human rights guidelines and basic PNP procedures also led to the following human rights violations:
“Everyone was simply presumed to be a criminal, regardless of the fact that the civilians in the area clearly bore no arms.
“The operation and its implementation was a gravest abuse of police authority, which turned deadly for the De Veras, Arnel Macalawan, Bernard Tungcab, Jessiery B. Basmayor, and Ronaldo Eusebio.
“The police personnel involved in the incident that led to these deaths failed to respect, and instead violated, the human rights of these victims.
xxx
“The PNP leadership should waste no time in clearing its ranks of the kind of errant, if not criminal, police officers. The only thing that distinguished them from the Waray Waray and Kuratong crime groups that they sought to neutralize was the yellow band around their heads.” (at pp. 57-61)
Upon its finding of multiple human rights violations, principally, the right against arbitrary deprivation of life and right to be secure in one’s person, the CHR Resolution recommended the filing of administrative and criminal charges for the a) the arbitrary killing or summary execution of Alfonso De Vera; b) the murder of Lia Allana De Vera; and c) obstruction of justice against members and superiors of HPG Team II and the same charges against HPG Team IV for the death of Eusebio. The Resolution also recommended that several ranking police officials be criminally prosecuted for a) obstruction of justice and b) dereliction of duty, for failing to produce, if not concealing, the firearms of HPG Team II used in the killing of Alfonso De Vera and Lia Allana De Vera, and for refraining from instituting prosecution against the members of HPG Team II.
Also recommended are policy reforms for the PNP, to wit: